

On the base of ElGamal signature Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm - ECDSA is created.


ECDSA is used in blockchain technologies.

Asymmetric cryptography

Asymmetric Encryption - Decryption

$$c = \text{Enc}(\text{PuK}_A, m)$$


$$m = \text{Dec}(\text{PrK}_A, c)$$



Asymmetric Signing - Verification

$$S = \text{Sig}(\text{PrK}_A, m)$$

$$V = \text{Ver}(\text{PuK}_A, S, m), V \in \{\text{True}, \text{False}\} \equiv \{1, 0\}$$



El-Gamal E-Signature

1. Public parameters generation:

1.1. Strong prime number p generation. Prime number p is Strong prime if $p=2q+1$, where q is prime.

1.2. Find a generator g in the group $\mathbb{Z}_p^* = \{1, 2, 3, \dots, p-1\}$, where multiplication operation is performed mod p .

Number g is a generator of $\mathbb{Z}_p^* = \{1, 2, 3, \dots, p-1\}$ iff $g^q \neq 1 \pmod{p}$ and $g^{2q} \neq 1 \pmod{p}$.

1.3. Declare Public Parameters to the network $\text{PP} = (p, g); \quad p \sim 2^{2048} \rightarrow |p| = 2048 \text{ bits}$

2. Key generation

- Randomly choose a private key X with $1 < X < p-2$.
- Compute $a = g^X \pmod{p}$.
- The private key is $\text{PrK}_A = X$.
- The public key is $\text{PuK}_A = a$.

3. Signature creation

To sign any finite message M the signer performs the following steps using public parameters PP .

- Compute $h=H(M)$.
- Choose a random k such that $1 < k < p - 2$ and $\gcd(k, p - 1) = 1$.
- Compute $k^{-1} \bmod (p-1)$: $k^{-1} \bmod (p-1)$ exists if $\gcd(k, p - 1) = 1$, i.e. k and $p-1$ are relatively prime.
 k^{-1} can be found using either Extended Euclidean algorithm or Euler theorem or
- >> $k_m1=\text{mulinv}(k,p-1)$ % $k^{-1} \bmod (p-1)$ computation.
- Compute $r=g^k \bmod p$
- Compute $s=(h-xr)k^{-1} \bmod (p-1) \rightarrow h=xr+sk \bmod (p-1)$.
Fermat's little theorem implies that all operations in the exponent are computed mod $(p-1)$
- Signature $S=\text{Sig}=(r,s)$

$$s = (h - xr)k^{-1} \bmod (p-1) /* k \Rightarrow sk = (h - xr) \cdot 1 \bmod (p-1) / + xr \\ \Rightarrow sk + xr = h \bmod (p-1) \Rightarrow h = sk + xr \bmod (p-1)$$

4. Signature Verification

A signature $S=\text{Sig}=(r,s)$ on message M is verified using Public Parameters $PP=(p, g)$ and $PuK_A=a$.

1. Bob computes $h=H(M)$.
2. Bob verifies if $1 < r < p-1$ and $1 < s < p-1$.
3. Bob verifies if $V1=a^r r^s \bmod p$, $V2=g^h \bmod p$ and $V1=V2$.

The verifier Bob accepts a signature if all conditions are satisfied and rejects it otherwise.

5. Correctness

The algorithm is correct in the sense that a signature generated with the signing algorithm will always be accepted by the verifier.

The signature generation implies

$$h=xr+ks \bmod (p-1)$$

Fermat's little theorem implies that all operations in the exponent are computed mod $(p-1)$

$$g^h = g^{(xr+ks) \bmod (p-1)} \bmod p = g^{xr} g^{ks} = (\underbrace{g^x}_a)^r (\underbrace{g^k}_r)^s = a^r r^s \bmod p$$

EI-Gamal E-Signature: using 24 bits arithmetics.

>> p=genstrongprime(24)

p=int64(15728302)

```

>> p=genstrongprime(24)
p = 15728303
>> q=(p-1)/2
q = 7864151
>> isprime(p)
ans = 1
>> isprime(q)
ans = 1
>> pb=dec2bin(p)
pb = 1110 1111 1111 1110 1010 1111
>> ph=dec2hex(p)
ph = EFFEAF

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p=int64(15728302)
g = 5
>> mod_exp(g,q,p)
ans = 15728302
>> mod_exp(g,2,p)
ans = 25
PP = (p=15728303, g=5);

```

$$\mathbb{Z}_{15}' = \{1, 2, 3, \dots, 14\} \quad \text{Operations performed mod 15}$$

Multiplication Tab.	Z15'	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
*	1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	
2	2	4	6	8	10	12	14	1	3	5	7	9	11	13	
3	3	6	9	12	0	3	6	9	12	0	3	6	9	12	
4	4	8	12	1	5	9	13	2	6	10	14	3	7	11	
5	5	10	0	5	10	0	5	10	0	5	10	0	5	10	
6	6	12	3	9	0	6	12	3	9	0	6	12	3	9	
7	7	14	6	13	5	12	4	11	3	10	2	9	1	8	
8	8	1	9	2	10	3	11	4	12	5	13	6	14	7	
9	9	3	12	6	0	9	3	12	6	0	9	3	12	6	
10	10	5	0	10	5	0	10	5	0	10	5	0	10	5	
11	11	7	3	14	10	6	2	13	9	5	1	12	8	4	
12	12	9	6	3	0	12	9	6	3	0	12	9	6	3	
13	13	11	9	7	5	3	1	14	12	10	8	6	4	2	
14	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	

```

>> k=8
k = 8
>> k_m1=mulinv(k,p-1)
k_m1 = Inverse element does not exist
>> gcd(k,p-1)
ans = 2
>> k=7
k = 7
>> k_m1=mulinv(k,p-1)

```

k_m1 = Inverse element does not exist

>> gcd(k,p-1)

ans = 2

>>

>> k=5

k = 5

>> k_m1=mulinv(k,p-1)

k_m1 = 3

>> mod(k*k_m1,p-1)

ans = 1